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NAVIGABIITY-ITS MEANING AND
APPLICATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of us are familiar, to some degree at least, with the
concept of federal navigability. Streams possessing this char-
acteristic are subject to various controls by the national govern-
ment for the public welfare.
Somewhat less familiar is the meaning and applicability of
the term in a state law context. In order to explore this topic,
South Carolina case and statutory law have been surveyed; and,
although South Carolina is by no means typical, it is probably
representative of the thirteen original states-at least in their
early development.
Three fairly distinct subcategories of navigability have been
found to exist in this state, each with different definitions and
implications. These are discussed in Section IV and are com-
mon law or technical navigability, navigability in fact, and
statutory navigability.
II. HISTORICAL PROSPECTIVE-PUBLIC RIGHTS
IN CERTAIN WATERS
The right of the public in the freedom to use certain waters
has been traced back at least to Justinian.' The Emperor had
declared that the seas are common to all; but when he said "all,"
he meant "all Romans." Later, with the help of a few wars, it
became settled that international waters were, indeed, "free for
navigation ... and for fishing and other public purposes for
which there is any substantial demand,"2 and the rights of
sovereigns over waters were reduced to territorial limits.
Territorial waters, of course, includes, for maritime nations,
inland waters and sea waters out to some limit. The limit varies
considerably depending on the country and the purpose for
which the delimitation is made.3 While the competition of pri-
vate, state, and federal interests, as well as foreign interests, in
off-shore waters is particularly intriguing, this discussion is
limited to fresh and tidal watercourses.
1. 1 WATERS ATD WATER RIGHTS 184 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
2. Id. at 187.
3. For a discussion of territorial waters see BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS 481-501 (2d. ed. 1962); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
188-90 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
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The common law of public interests in waters was, of course,
inherited by this country from England. During the time that
law was under development, the primary interest of the public
in waterways was for transportation.4 The same was true in
this country and "[ilt is, therefore scarcely surprising that com-
mercial navigability has been the great line of demarcation for
a variety of legal purposes where inland waters are concerned."r5
III. NAVIGABILITY Il T UNITED STATEs
Upon achieving their independence, the original states suc-
ceeded to the rights which the prior sovereign had in waters
as well as other property. Thus, the control over streams used
by the public as well as ownership in the beds of such streams
vested in the sovereign states.6 While the states exercised con-
trol over their navigable waters, the ultimate authority was
granted to the Federal Government by the commerce clause of
the Constitution. 7 Even so, the actual ownership of the streams
remains in the states.
8
The general rule, then, is that the states both own and con-
trol the navigable streams within their borders, subject to
exercise of the superior right of control in the United States.9
State and federal concepts of navigability may not agree, but
when federal interests are at stake, the federal test will govern.
That test was laid down in an 1870 case, The Daniel Ball:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible
of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are, or may
be, conducted in the customary modes of trade or travel
on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the
United States, within the meaning of the acts of Con-
gress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters
of the States, when they form in their ordinary condi-
tion, by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a
continued highway over which commerce is or may
4. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 203 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
5. Id.
6. 3 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY 249 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS 206 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1 § 8.
8. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
9. 3 AMEPiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY 245 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS 207 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
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be, carried on with other States or foreign countries,
in the customary modes in which such commerce is
conducted by water.10
This test, as refined and interpreted, is still the federal rule.1
In The Daniel Ball,12 the Supreme Court rejected the common
law rule existing at the time of independence. In England, as
well as in civil law countries, only tidewaters, those waters
where the tide ebbs and flows, were considered navigable. 1
Most states, following in the federal footsteps, rejected the
common law rule and even assumed title of both tidal and non-
tidal stream beds susceptible of actual navigation.
14
There are exceptions, however, to the "overwhelming majority
rule of state ownership of lands beneath navigable waters,"'lr
and, as we shall see, South Carolina finds itself in the minority.
In the minority states, it was considered that property rights
vested at the time of succession to sovereignty and that the state
took title only to tidal-navigable streams while riparian owners
took title to all stream beds, both navigable and non-navigable,
if non-tidal.16 Even in the minority states, however, the private
ownership of the bed will not affect the rights of the public to
use navigable waters.
IV. NAVIGABILITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The issue of navigability has arisen in a number of civil and
criminal actions in this state, and all the cases in which it be-
came a substantial issue are collected here. In order to observe
the historical development, the cases are presented chronologi-
cally under more or less natural grouping into which they fall.
A. Title to Non-Tidal Stream Beds.
In (ates v. Wadlington,17 suit was brought on a bond for the
sale price of land conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant.
The defendant sought an adjustment of the amount due since
a portion of the acreage conveyed included part of the Enoree
10. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
11. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 206 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
12. 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
13. 3 AimEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 251 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS 208 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
14. 3 Am ERcAx LAW OF PROPERTY 252 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS 207-08 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
15. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 208 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
16. 3 AmEpIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY 252 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
17. 1 McCord 580 (S.C. 1822).
[Vol. 123
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River, which could not, it was contended, be conveyed since it
was capable of navigation. The trial court ruled that streams
were proper subjects of grant even if capable of being made
navigable until the state actually made them so. On appeal,
the supreme court avoided the navigability issue by holding
that the grantor conveyed whatever interest he had in the bed
and that was what the grantee got and should pay for. The
court did, by way of dictum, go on to discuss the navigability-
property issues. While not necessarily dipositive of the prop-
erty question, the court felt that the English rule of ebb and
flow did not govern navigability in this state. The seeds of the
minority rule were planted when the court found that, if the
river were only capable of being made navigable, ownership of
the bed might not be impaired if it were subsequently declared
and made navigable. As to an actual rule of navigability, the
closest that the court came was to suggest a rule of non-naviga-
bility:
And although we cannot define by technical terms
what constitutes a navigable river in this state, yet I
presume we may venture to say that cannot be con-
sidered a navigable river, the natural obstructions of
which prevent the passage of boats of any description
whatever.1 s
In the next case, Boatwight v. Bookman,"9 an 1839 case, the
court again avoided several navigability issues which were
raised at trial. The plaintiff sued some commissioners, charged
with the maintenance of fish sluices, for destroying the plain-
tiff's fish traps in the Congaree River. The commissioners con-
tended that they were authorized to assure the free passage of
fish in this navigable stream. The plaintiff, however, main-
tained that the side of the stream he used was not used or useful
for fish or boat sluices and was, therefore, outside the jurisdic-
tion of the commissioners. The question was thus raised whether
a stream may be navigable in the middle and non-navigable
toward the edge. The trial court bought that theory and held
that even though the Congaree was navigable, the part the
plaintiff had obstructed "was not to be considered a highway
for the purpose of navigation .... -20 On appeal, the court
avoided this interesting proposition by merely holding that the
18. Id. at 582-83.
19. Rice 447 (S.C. 1839).
20. Id. at 448.
4
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river being public, the public may trap it so long as navigation
is not, as here, obstructed.
In Jacks nv. Lewis,21 the South Carolina Supreme Court was
again asked, and again refused to decide whether there could
be private ownership in the bed of a navigable stream and
whether a stream could be navigable in part and non-navigable
at the edge. This case was also similar to the Boatwight
22
facts. The plaintiff had a "fishing stand" located between an
island and the west bank of the Catawba River, a portion
"never used for boating." He also claimed title to the land on
both banks. The defendant also claimed both banks and de-
stroyed the fishing stand. The trial court felt that it was
immaterial whether the part of the river in question was naviga-
ble or not and let the case go to the jury, reserving the question
of whether there could be ownership of the bed, i.e., the fishing
stand. The jury found for the plaintiff since he had better
title to the banks. In refusing to answer the question reserved
to it, the supreme court held that, if the plaintiff's grant ex-
tended to the bed of the stream, he had exclusive fishing rights
and, if it did not, he had the public right to fish under Boat-
unriglt; and in neither event could the defendant interfere.2 3
In Noble v. C'unningham24 the court decided that a deed list-
ing the Little River as a boundary conveyed the title to one-half
the bed, since the river was non-navigable; and the grantee *was
required to pay for the underwater acreage.
Mc'ulloug v. Wall25 was another fishing stand case in the
same part of the Catawba River as was the one in Jackson v.
Lewis.26 In upholding a five dollar verdict for trespass by the
defendant, the court at great length reviewed the navigability-
property problem without appreciably clarifying it.
The narrow question before the court was whether the plain-
tiff had valid title to a rock in the river trespassed upon by the
defendant. The plaintiff's claim stemmed from his alleged title
in one bank. The defendant, of course, claimed that the river
was navigable which negated any title to rocks or the bed of the
river and gave him the right to fish, as a member of the public,
from any place in the river, rock or otherwise.
21. Cheves 259 (S.C. 1840).
22. Boatwright v. Booknan, Rice 447 (S.C. 1839).
23. Jackson v. Lewis, Chevis 259 (S.C. 1840).
24. McMul. Eq. 289 (S.C. 1841).
25. 4 Rich. 68 (S.C. 1850).
26. Chevis 259 (S.C. 1840).
[VoL 23
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The thrust of the defendant's argument was that the legisla-
ture, beginning in 1795, had declared that the river "be made
navigable" and that it had been. Without necessarily agreeing
that it had, the court found that the plaintiff's right to the bed
accrued under a grant of 1772 and that the jury had found as
a fact that the river was not then navigable and so any legis-
lation as to improving navigation would be ihieffective to alter
title to the bed.
By way of an alternative holding, the court placed South
Carolina in the minority position discussed above. The state-
ments in Cates v. Wadlington27 to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, "no authoritative decision has yet been made in this State
which changed the common law on the subject." 2
By the common law, only those rivers were deemed
navigable in which the tide ebbs and flows: and
"grants of land bounded on rivers... above tide water,
carry the exclusive right and title of the grantee to the
centre of the stream . . . and the public, in cases where
the river is navigable for boats and rafts, have an ease:
ment therein, or a right of passage as a public high-
way.
29
But lest it be thought that this settled the question com-
pletely, it should be noted that the court also said:
The occasion does not require any exact definition
to be now given of a navigable river, according to the
law of this State, in which the ownership of the soil
shall not belong to the riparian proprietors: perhaps
the principal occasion of dispute on the subject has
been the use of the term navigable, which has a popular
signification different from the technical one which is
given to it by the common law.30
Perhaps the clearest assertion of the common law rule was
stated by the Chancellor in reviewing an equity decision again
denying a purchaser of land adjustment of price for acreage
below an alleged navigable stream. In iSands v. Triplet3l it
was observed:
It is assumed in the ground of appeal, that the soil
covered by waters of a navigable river belongs to the
27. 1 McCord 580 (S.C. 1822).
28. McCullough v. Wall, 4 Rich 68 (S.C. 1850).
29. Id. at 88.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. 5 Rich. Eq. 76 (S.C. 1852).
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State, and not to the riparian proprietors. The term
navigable is equivocal. By the common law, rivers are
regarded as navigable only to such extent as the tide
flows and ebbs; and the property in the beds of rivers
navigable in this sense, is undoubtedly in the State.
But in our statutes, and in popular speech, navigable
rivers mean those which may be navigated by ships or
boats; and as to rivers of this class above tide water,
it is not to be conceded that the State remains owner of
the beds after granting the lands on both sides.
32
The court recognized that the common law could be altered,
of course, in the public interest but was inclined to think that
the courts would not do so and that "it would be inexpedient
even for the Legislature to divest the proprietors of lands,
bounding on rivers above tide-water, of their rights to the
soil covered by the waters of the rivers."33
Unfortunately, the court went on to ruin any holding that
might be derived from the case by stating: "If the foregoing
views should be utterly unsound, still the appellant is not en-
titled to his motion"34; and holding for affirmance on other
equitable grounds.
The final case in this series seems to establish the rule firmly
in this state that the beds of non-tidal streams navigable in fact
are subject to private ownership. In State v. Columbia3u the
city sought to impose a tax upon the bridge across the Congaree
River. The bridge owner contended that the city's boundary
was the river and that, since the bridge was, therefore, outside
the city, it could not validly impose the tax. It was shown that
the original layout of the city was a square which would in-
clude a good part of the river and the bridge unless the city
could not own the river bed.
The court held that the public has a navigation easement in
streams which are navigable in fact, yet where the streams are
not technically navigable (meaning ebb and flow), the public
right does not deprive the riparian of title to the center of the
stream.36
B. The Statutory Right to Navigate.
We have seen a line of cases developing what may be con-
32. Id. at 77-78.
33. Id. at 79.
34. Id. at 80.
35. 27 S.C. 137, 3 S.E. 55 (1887).
36. Id. at 146.
[Vol. 2
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sidered two "common law" concepts of navigability. True
common law navigability seems to be restricted to tidal waters
and in the section following this one, we will examine further,
the interest of the state in those waters. "Navigability in fact"
seems to be a separate common law concept giving the public
the right to navigate and otherwise use the stream. In addition,
we now examine situations in which the legislature created the
right to navigate certain streams.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in this state, there
began a large increase in the lumber business. As a result dams
were built across streams for powering saw mills and the logs
were floated down to the mills. The legislature, interested in
developing the industry, foresaw the problem that new mill-
dams might cut off the old ones from their supply of logs. In
order to prevent that result, the legislature declared certain
streams navigable and provided that their obstruction could be
abated as a nuisance.
The first of the cases applying this rule was State V. Thomp-
son.37 The legislature had authorized the Pacolet River "to be
made navigable" by a private corporation. The defendant was
indicted for damming the stream and defended on the ground
that, since the legislature directed that the Pacolet be "made
navigable," it had declared that it was not then navigable so
that the indictment would be improper. This conviction was
affirmed, however, because the court found that the stream was
navigable in fact and
the appropriation by the Legislature to facilitate navi-
gation ought not to extinguish the common law char-
acter of a river as a public highway for navigation;
else we might not have, perhaps, a single such river in
the State. I could conceive that the Broad river might
have been such a stream, even in the hunter age, pro-
vided it was capable for and was navigated by the
canoes of the day. And if the advancement of the age
induced the Legislature to apply means that should
render it capable of sustaining steam-boats or pole-
boats, it did not appear that the stream would lose its
primary dignity on that account.
38
The next two cases arose under an 1825 Act of the Legislature
providing:
37. 2 Strob. 12 (S.C. 1847).
38. Id. at 15.
1971]
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No person shall erect any mill dam, or other obstruc-
tion, across any stream used for the purposes of navi-
gation by boats, flats or rafts of lumber or timber,
without sufficient locks, slopes or canals, to admit free
navigation of such streams .... 39
In State v. CuZlum4° the defendant had been indicted for
obstructing such a stream. His defense was that the Act of 1825
only affected streams then "used for purposes of navigation"
and that this stream was not cleared for rafting lumber until
1830. The supreme court affirmed the conviction holding that
the clearing of obstructions made the stream navigable under
the Act and that "[tihe term 'used' is a participle, and may have
a past, present and future meaning . . ."41 and "refers to the
use of it which should give it a public character" at the time of
the defendant's act.
42
State v. flickcso, 4 3 was very similar with one crucial differ-
ence. Here, the defendant built his dam in 1830 before the
stream had been cleared for rafting. His conviction was re-
versed by the supreme court which went on to say:
At the time Hickson built his mill, it is very clear that
Shaw's creek was not a stream used for navigation. ....
It has become so since, but that has been done by pri-
vate enterprize, and neither Hlickson or the Legislature
have dedicated it to public use.
4
The case seems to say that small non-navigable streams may be
kept that way by the riparian proprietors merely by erecting a
permanent obstruction, thus forestalling the development of
navigation. The court did seem to indicate that this result
might not be conclusive upon the Legislature as to "large fresh
water streams, which by nature are navigable." It is difficult
to determine whether the court considers the distinction to be
the stream size or that the creek was made navigable by "private
enterprise" and not nature or the Legislature. It is likely that
the court considered that the opposite result would be to divest
the owner of property rights valid when acquired.
A more modern case was State v. Columbia Water Power
Co. 5 The State sought to enjoin the Water Company from ob-
39. VI Stat. 268 (S.C. 1825) (emphasis added).
40. 2 Spears 581 (S.C. 1844).
41. Id. at 585.
42. Id.
43. 5 Rich. 447 (S.C. 1852).
44. Id. at 451.
45. State v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 63 S.E. 884 (1909).
(Vol. 2.3
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structing the Columbia Canal by its water intake pipe located
just above the surface. Since the issue was "whether in its
present condition [the canal] is navigable," the court proceeded
to examine that question by three approaches. Looking first to
the Legislature, the court found it had intended that the canal
be constructed for navigation purposes and for the purpose of
supplying water to the city. In fact, it was not being used for
navigation since a lock was inoperative at one end, but was
being used by the Water Company for its other intended pur-
pose-water supply. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
intended use for navigation was clear for purpose of preventing
obstructions.
As to its navigability generally, the court provided what may
be the clearest though strictest guidelines to that term.
It is true, that according to the generally accepted defi-
nition, water is navigable when in its ordinary state
it forms by itself or its connection with other waters a
continued highway over which commerce is or may be
carried in the customary mode in which such commerce
is conducted by water .... Under the definition, a
stream not naturally navigable but made so by artificial
means is not navigable in a legal sense . . . . [How-
ever,] the canal is to be regarded as a part of . . .[the
Broad and Congaree livers] and navigable, just as any
other portion of them is navigable.46
The fact that ther was now no commerce on the canal was not
controlling because
[tjhe navigability of water does not depend on actual
use for navigation, but on its capacity for such use ....
It is true that where the character of the water is in
doubt, the fact that it has never been used for naviga-
tion after long settlement of the country might pos-
sibly be evidence tending to show that is was not
susceptible of navigation; but it would be nothing
more than evidence.
4
7
In a third approach, the court found that, by the terms of
the grants to the property of the canal, its continued use for
navigation was required.48
46. Id. at 186, 63 S.E. at 887.
47. Id. at 187, 63 S.E. at 888.
48. Adains v. Georgia-Carolihm Power Co., 101 S.C. 170, 85 S.E. 312
(1914), was a later case in which the court refused to determine the owner-
ship of a strip of land between the bank and the middle of the Savannah River.
The court summarily found the river to be navigable.
1971]
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The current legislative enactment defining navigability and
requiring freedom from obstruction may be found in section
70-1 of the South Carolina Code of Laws which provides:
All streams which have been rendered or can be
rendered capable of being navigated by rafts of lumber
or timber by the removal of accidental obstructions and
all navigable watercourses and cuts are hereby declared
navigable streams and such streams shall be common
highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants
of this State as to citizens of the United States, without
any tax or impost therefor, unless such tax or impost
be expressly provided for by the General Assembly. If
any person shall obstruct any such stream, otherwise
than as in this Title provided, such person shall be
guilty of a nuisance and such obstruction may be
abated as other public nuisances are by law.
49
C. Tidal-Navigab7e Waters.
Since it had been decided that the state interest in the beds
of navigable streams was limited by the English rule of tidal
waters, it is not surprising that in many of the cases involving
tidal waters, the state is asserting its title to disputed marsh-
type land.
In State v. Pinckney ° the state sought recovery of land be-
tween the high and low-water marks of a tidal body of water.
The court found the correct common law rule to be that
[t]he space between the high and low water mark of
the border of the sea is called the "shore," and belongs
by the common law to the sovereign, unless aequired
by grant from the sovereign .... r"
Disregarding the early statement to the contrary, the court held
that the common law was unchanged by any authoritative de-
cision affecting title to the land.
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-1 (1962). See also, S.C. CoxsT. art 1, § 28. But
a waterway need not be navigable in order to be unobstructable as a public
highway. In Heyward v. Chisolm, 11 Rich. 253 (S.C. 1858), a ditch contain-
ing 18 inches of water at high and none at low tide had been used for small
boats for over 40 years by the public. It was found that the ditch could not
be closed to the boats by the owner, though not navigable, because it had been
dedicated to the public as a highway. Thus all navigable waterways may be
public highways but all public highways over water need not be navigable.
50. 22 S.C. 484 (1884).
51. Id. at 507, quoting from 3 WASHBURn, REAL PROPERTY 632 (emphasis
added).
Vol. 2
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State v. Pacific Guano Co.52 arose under a statute designed
to "protect the rights and interests of the state in the phosphate
rocks and phosphatic deposits in the navigable streams and
waters of the state .. . ."3 Damages and an injunction were
sought from the out-of-state corporate defendant. The question
of interest arose as to streams which were tidal but not navi-
gable in fact. This case is cited for the proposition that "the
presence of a tide creates merely a rebuttable presumption of
navigability"54; however, a close reading of the case reveals no
such presumption. The court, on appeal, did take an unusual
approach to the question. The circuit court had ruled:
Chisohn's creek and Big creek were not navigable
streams. Although the tide ebbs and flows through
them, yet the conditions necessary to sustain trade or
commerce of any kind do not exist . . . . [T]hey lose
themselves in the marshes with which they are sur-
rounded. They are entirely within the private estate
of the owners of the island and make no connection
with thoroughfares of travel or trade and are none
themselves.r5
After observing that "the fundamental idea [of the common
law] was that the property in the sea and tide-waters, and in
the soil and shore thereof, was in the sovereign," ' the court
went on to sustain the opinion below as a factual question not
reviewable on appeal.
[Tihe Circuit judge, notwithstanding the positive rule
of the common law as to the navigability of all tidal
streams, held that even tidal channels are navigable in
law only when they are navigable in fact ... and we
cannot say that this was error of law .... These were
pure findings of fact by the Circuit judge .... 57
We cannot hold that the bed of a creek not navigable,
although tidal, belongs to the state to the exclusion of
the riparian proprietor.58
Thus, the court took the unusual tack of allowing the circuit
judge to displace the common law by declaring that it was a
factual finding not subject to review in a law case.
52. 22 S.C. 50 (1884).
53. XVI Stat. 615 (S.C. 1878).
54. 3 A~m caN LAW OF PROPEaTY 253 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
55. State v. Pacific Guano, 22 S.C. 50, 68 (1884).
56. Id. at 75.
57. Id. at 77.
58. Id. at 79.
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Interestingly, the next case some ten years later was also a
law case heard by the circuit court as trier of fact. In Heyward
v. Farmers' Mining fo.,59 a trespass action, the trial court, using
the very language used by the trial court in Pacifio Guano,"
found as a fact that certain streams were not navigable and was
reversed on appeal. The ruling is neatly summed up by the
headnote editor:
Therefore, where the trial judge ruled that a tidal creek
was not a navigable stream of the State, because it
ran up into a private estate and lost itself in the sur-
rounding marsh, because it had never been used as a
highway for commerce, and there seemed to be no pros-
pect of its ever being so used, and because it makes no
connection with other highways, he erred in all of
these rulings.61
The court considered all these conditions irrelevant to the
true test--navigable capacity; "to be navigable, a stream should
have sufficient depth and width to float useful commerce ... . ,0.2
As a result the plaintiff could not have title to the tidal lands,
and his trespass action failed.
Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Caroeina
Canning Co. 63 was another trespass action to determine whether
the plaintiff or the defendant had the right to harvest oysters
on a large tract of land between the high and low-water mark
of a tidal navigable stream.
The contest was between one who held title under a grant
from the state and one who held under a lease by a state com-
mission. The court found for the lessee stating: "The title to
land below high-water mark on tidal navigable streams, under
the well-settled rule, [citing nothing] is in the State, not for the
purpose of sale, but to be held in trust for public purposes."
6 4
Dissenting, Justice Cothran thought it was too much to swallow
for a state grant of land, purporting to convey over 34,000 acres,
to convey effectively only 6.2 acres and further thought that
only the land below low-water mark was to be held in trust for
59. 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 64 (1894).
60. State v. Pacific Guano, 22 S.C. 50 (1884).
61. Heyward v. Farmers Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 64 (1894) (head-
note 8).
62. Id. at 150.
63. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1926).
64. Id.
(Vol. 9,3
13
Wald: Navigability--Its Meaning and Application in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1971
WATER REsouRCEs RESEA H PROJEOT
the public and that this land was held in a more proprietary
function.05
If there is justification in the majority view, it may be ex-
tracted from the last case in this series, Early v. SoutAh Carolina
Public Service Authority.6 The plaintiff sought compensation
in an inverse condemnation proceeding for damages brought
about by the backing of salt water into the otherwise fresh
water river. The court, in setting the rights and limits of the
state held:
The right of the sovereign, in the exercise of the navi-
gation servitude, to take or damage or destroy private
property without obligation to compensate therefor ex-
tends to the bed of the navigable stream, i.e. to mean
high water mark on either bank-and no farther; for
damage beyond that boundary the constitution requires
just compensation. 7
Thus, the reservation of the title between high and low-water
in the state allows the freedom and flexibility necessary, in some
cases, to exercise the navigation servitude without the require-
ment of compensation.
V. CONCLUSION
In summarizing the law of navigability in South Carolina,
one is tempted to repeat the oft-quoted words of Chancellor
Wardlaw: "The term navigable is equivocal."6 s Perhaps, at
least we could say that the central factor is "navigability in
fact" which only refers to the natural capacity of a stream to
be useful to commerce. It might be thought that the legislature
could have aided the simplification and clarification of the
concept by defining the term, yet we have seen instances in
which the declaration of the legislature was unavailing either in
declaring navigable a stream which had been non-navigable in
fact 9 or in negating the navigability of a stream navigable in
fact.70 It may even be doubtful that a legislative enactment
intended to displace the common law on this subject would be
65. Id. at 444-45 (dissenting opinion). The emphasized language in Pinck-
ney v. State, supra note 45, would seem to support this position.
66. 228 S.C. 392, 90 S.E2d 472 (1955).
67. Id. at 407.
68. Shands v. Triplet, 5 Rich. Eq. 76, 77-78 (S.C. 1852).
69. State v. Hickson, 5 Rich. 447 (S.C. 1852); McCullough v. Wall, 4
Rich. 68 (S.C. 1850).
70. State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (1884).
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effective in the face of vested property rights. And finally, we
have seen the most easily administered rule of navigability-
technical or tidal navigability-modified by the superimposi-
tion of navigability in fact.71 This, too, may have resulted in
the vesting of rights and it would probably be difficult to re-
store the state's rights in tidal-non-navigable lands.
Court-made navigability may be a useful concept; it at least
seems to be a permanent fixture, but it is certainly equivocal.
Em W. WALD
71. Early v. South Carolina Public Serv. Auth., 228 S.C. 392, 90 S.E. 2d
472 (1955).
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